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AGGREGATED ROYALTIES FOR TOP-DOWN FRAND DETERMINATIONS:
REVISITING “JOINT NEGOTIATION”
[Draft 8 Aug. 2017]
JORGE L. CONTRERAS*

ABSTRACT
In an environment in which widely-adopted technical standards may each be covered by
large numbers of patents, there have been increasing calls for courts to determine “fair,
reasonable and non-discriminatory” (FRAND) royalties payable to holders of standardsessential patents (SEPs) using “top-down” methodologies. Top-down royalty approaches begin
with the aggregate royalty that should be payable with respect to all SEPs covering a particular
standard, and then allocate a portion of the total to individual SEPs. Top-down approaches
avoid many drawbacks associated with bottom-up approaches in which royalties for individual
SEPs are assessed, often in an inconsistent and piecemeal manner, without regard for the other
SEPs that cover the standard. Yet despite the potential benefits of top-down methodologies, one
of the most promising means for determining aggregate royalty levels – joint agreement by the
members of the relevant standards-development organization (SDO) – has gained little traction.
The idea of SDO participants jointly negotiating FRAND royalties attracted the attention of
commentators and antitrust agencies about a decade ago, when a handful of SDOs began to
explore mandatory ex ante rate disclosure requirements. But few SDOs adopted such policies,
and joint negotiations were never incorporated into the mainstream standardization process.
One of the principal reason that SDOs have been hesitant to endorse joint royalty negotiations is
the perceived risk of antitrust liability arising from concerted action among competitors. But as
numerous commentators and antitrust officials have reiterated, this fear is largely misplaced in
the context of industry standard-setting. Thus, SDOs should follow the lead of patent pools and
begin more actively to determine aggregate patent royalty burdens for standards that they
develop. In addition, antitrust and competition authorities should assure the market that
collective agreement on aggregate royalty rates alone should not give rise to antitrust liability.
Keywords: FRAND, standards, SEP, patent, joint negotiation, oligopsony
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I. THE CASE FOR AGGREGATED STANDARDS ROYALTIES
A. Many Patents, Many Royalties?
Many standards development organizations (SDOs) require that their participants license
patents that are essential to standardized products (standards-essential patents or SEPs) to
product manufacturers on terms that are fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND). An
extensive literature and growing body of case law exists regarding the determination of FRAND
royalties.1 But even if individual royalty rates can be considered “fair” and “reasonable”, when
large numbers of patents are involved, there is a risk that the total royalty burden on a
standardized product can become excessive. This is the familiar issue of royalty stacking. As has
been discussed extensively in the literature, royalty stacking is a variant of the well-known
Cournot complements problem in which different firms each control necessary inputs to
production and act in an uncoordinated manner when charging a manufacturer for the use of
those inputs.2 As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has explained,
[r]oyalty stacking can arise when a standard implicates numerous patents, perhaps
hundreds, if not thousands. If companies are forced to pay royalties to all [patent]
holders, the royalties will ‘stack’ on top of each other and may become excessive in
the aggregate.”3
Under most current SEP licensing frameworks, the negotiation of FRAND license
agreements is left to bilateral interactions between SEP holders and manufacturers of
standardized products. In these cases, SEP holders have little incentive to consider royalty rates
charged by anyone other than themselves. Yet some broadly adopted standards are covered by
patents held by dozens and sometimes more than a hundred different firms.4 Thus, if each of
____________________
1

See, generally, Chryssoula Pentheroudakis & Justus A. Baron, Licensing Terms of Standard Essential
Patents: A Comprehensive Analysis of Cases. JRC Science for Policy Report EUR 28302 at 95-96 (2017) (collecting
and summarizing cases); Jorge L. Contreras, Patents, Technical Standards and Standards-Setting Organizations:
A Survey of the Empirical, Legal and Economics Literature, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: ANALYTICAL METHODS (Vol. 2) (Peter Menell et al., eds., 2017) (collecting
literature).
2
See, e.g., Pierre Régibeau, Raphaël De Coninck and Hans Zenger, Transparency, Predictability, and
Efficiency of SSO-based Standardization and SEP Licensing: A Report for the European Commission 15-17 (2016)
(discussing relevance of Cournot complements problem in standard-setting); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro,
Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2013–15 (2007) (describing the problems of Cournot
complements and double marginalization and their potential to lead to hold-up in SEP markets), Joseph Farrell, John
Hayes, Carl Shapiro & Theresa Sullivan, Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 642
(2007) (“the sum of the incremental values of [multiple] patents exceeds their value in combination”).
3
Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., 773 F.3d 1201, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2015). See also In re. Innovatio IP Ventures,
LLC Patent Litig., U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144061 at *62 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (“the determination of a RAND royalty must
address the risk of royalty stacking”)
4
See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
60233 at *213 (W.D. Wash., Apr. 25, 2013) (“[t]here are at least 92 entities that own 802.11 [standard-essential
1

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3051502

these SEP holders independently sought to maximize its royalty revenue, patent royalties could
far exceed sustainable product prices.5
Commentators disagree whether royalty stacking is currently having a significant impact
on prices or innovation in industries such as wireless telecommunications that are heavily
dependent on standardized technologies. Some researchers claim that there is no empirical
evidence that royalty stacking is a significant issue in practice.6 Estimates of the actual royalty
stack for mobile telephone products range from about 4-5%7 to 30% of the product price.8 But
even if lower-end estimates are accepted, Pierre Régibeau et al. hypothesize that current royalty
levels may be depressed due to uncertainty surrounding patent litigation and may rise once
litigation is resolved.9 What’s more, there are clear indications that developers of standardized
technologies are increasingly transferring SEPs to patent assertion entities (in some cases known
as privateers) for the purpose of asserting those patents.10 If this trend continues, royalty stacking
could become a serious issue for product manufacturers, particularly in emerging areas such as
the Internet of Things and broadband 5G wireless connectivity.11
Given the growing recognition of these issues, commentators, courts and policy makers
have become increasingly attracted to mechanisms that take into account the aggregate royalty
burden associated with a standard when considering the royalties owed to any particular patent
holder. Thus, as the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois noted in Innovatio,
“the determination of a [F]RAND royalty must address the risk of royalty stacking by

patents]”); Bekkers, Rudi & Joel West. 2009. “The limits to IPR Standardization Policies as evidenced by Strategic
Patenting in UMTS,” 33 Telecommunications Policy 80 (72 holders of SEPs covering ETSI’s 3G UMTS standard).
5
See Microsoft, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60233 at *213.
6
See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak, The Antitrust Division’s Devaluation of Standard-Essential Patents, 104 GEO.
L.J. ONLINE 48, 61 (2015) (“By early 2015, more than two dozen economists and lawyers had disapproved or
disputed the numerous assumptions and predictions of the patent-holdup and royalty-stacking conjectures.”); Anne
Layne-Farrar, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Theory and Evidence: Where Do We Stand After 15 Years of
History? (Submitted for 122nd Meeting of the OECD Competition Committee, Dec. 17-18, 2014),
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/WD%282014%2984&docla
nguage=en (also citing lack of empirical evidence).
7
See J. Gregory Sidak, What Aggregate Royalty to Manufacturers of Mobile Phones Pay to License StandardEssential Patents?, 1 CRITERION J. INNOVATION 701 (2016); Keith Mallinson, Cumulative Mobile-SEP Royalty
Payments No More Than Around 5% of Mobile Handset Revenues, WiseHarbor (2015),
http://www.wiseharbor.com/pdfs/Mallinson%20on%20cumulative%20
mobile%20SEP%20royalties%20for%20IP%20Finance%202015Aug19.pdf
8
Ann Armstrong, Joseph J. Mueller, & Timothy D. Syrett, The Smartphone Royalty Stack: Surveying Royalty
Demands for the Components Within Modern Smartphones (Working Paper, May 29, 2014), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2443848. But see Keith Mallinson, Smartphone Revolution:
Technology Patenting and Licensing Fosters Innovation, Market Entry, and Exceptional Growth, IEEE CONSUMER
ELECTRONICS MAGAZINE, Apr. 2015, 60-66 (challenging findings of Armstrong et al.) and Layne-Farrar, supra note
6 (also raising several challenges to Armstrong et al.).
9
Régibeau et al., supra note 2, at 19.
10
See Part I.C, infra.
11
See, e.g., Jason R. Bartlett & Jorge L. Contreras, Rationalizing FRAND Royalties: Can Interpleader Save the
Internet of Things, __ REV. LITIG. __, Part I.D (2017, forthcoming); Fiona Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, Patent
Assertions: Are We Any Closer to Aligning Reward to Contribution?, 32 (NBER Working Paper No. 21678, 2015)
(“Failure to prevent patent hold-up relating to tomorrow’s information technology and communications standards is
likely to cause significant social welfare loss in the years ahead”).
2

considering the aggregate royalties that would apply if other [SEP] holders made royalty
demands of the implementer.”12 Royalty calculation methodologies that seek to address these
issues can broadly be termed “top-down” approaches because they look first to the overall level
of royalties associated with a standard and then seek to allocate the appropriate portion of this
total to individual patent holders. Top-down approaches implicitly recognize that, when multiple
patents cover a single standard, the rate charged by one SEP holder will necessarily affect the
rates that the other SEP holders are able to obtain from a single manufacturer.13
Top-down approaches contrast with “bottom-up” royalty approaches, in which royalties
due to individual patent holders are determined independently of one another, and the total
royalty burden emerges only as the sum of its individual components.14 Courts applying bottomup approaches have used different royalty calculation criteria and factors case by case, even
when patents covering the same features of the same standard have been involved, thus yielding
inconsistent and potentially excessive results.15 For example, in 2013 and 2014, five different
U.S. district courts calculated royalties for a total of thirty-five SEPs covering Wi-Fi standards.
The aggregate royalty for these thirty-five patents amounted to approximately 4.5% of the total
sale price of a typical $50 Wi-Fi router.16 Yet it has been estimated that there are approximately
3,000 patents covering the Wi-Fi standard,17 nearly one hundred times the number subject to
adjudication thus far. Were the royalty for each of these patents to be calculated in a similarly
uncoordinated, bottom-up manner, the aggregate patent royalty on a Wi-Fi router could easily
surpass the product’s total selling price by at least an order of magnitude.
B. Top-Down Approaches in the Courts
Due to the issues noted above, a number of courts around the world have begun to
explore the use of top-down royalty allocation methodologies for standardized products. The
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois took a step in this direction in Innovatio,
when it held that the aggregate per-product royalty attributable to the Wi-Fi standard should be
$1.80, and then apportioned a fraction of this total to the plaintiff.18 As noted by the trial judge, a
“Top Down approach best approximates the RAND rate that the parties to a hypothetical ex ante
negotiation most likely would have agreed upon…”19

____________________
12

Innovatio, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144061 at *62 (internal quotes omitted).
See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 2, at 2011 (“the royalty rate negotiated by one patent holder is affected by
the rates the downstream firm pays to other patent holders, so a proper analysis must account for the joint
determination of all the royalty rates”).
14
See Bartlett & Contreras, supra note 11, at Part I.D (discussing and providing examples of bottom-up
calculations).
15
See id. at __ and Table 2.
16
Id.
17
Innovatio, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144061 at *179.
18
See id.at *83.
19
Id. at *163. See also Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Damages Heuristics, __ TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. __, ms pp.
43-44 (forthcoming 2017) (discussing Innovatio top-down analysis), Pentheroudakis & Baron, supra note 1, at 9596 (analyzing top-down approaches Innovatio and other cases).
13
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Likewise, in Samsung v. Apple Japan20, the Japanese Intellectual Property High Court held
that the aggregate royalty burden for the 3G UMTS standard should not exceed 5%. It then
allocated a portion of this total royalty to Samsung’s asserted UMTS-essential patent based on
the total number of SEPs likely to be essential to the standard.21
Perhaps the most significant recent use of a top-down FRAND royalty calculation occurred
in Unwired Planet v. Huawei, decided by the UK High Court of Justice (Patents) in April,
2017.22 In this case, the court determined the aggregate royalty attributable to a standard under all
applicable SEPs and then allocated an appropriate amount to the SEP holder asserting the patents
in suit. Under the court’s top-down methodology, the FRAND royalty was calculated as the
aggregate SEP royalty burden of a particular standard on a product (i.e., the portion of a
smartphone’s price that should be charged for all patents covering 4G) multiplied by the
percentage of the total number of SEPs held by the plaintiff.23 To calculate the aggregate royalty
burden attributable to the various standards in suit, the court considered public statements made
by other holders of SEPs with respect to royalties on those standards.24 It then calculated the
plaintiff’s share of the total SEP pool, using a variety of counting and filtering methodologies,
including a filter for the likely essentiality of the patents in the asserted portfolio.25 The result
calculated by the court was consistent with the result that it obtained using a methodology based
on comparable licenses.26
C. Top-Down Approaches and Privateering
In addition to helping courts more fairly determine the royalties owed to individual patent
holders, top-down approaches to SEP royalties may also help to address emerging issues
associated with “privateering” of SEPs.27 An increasing number of operating companies that
were or are active in standards development appear to be transferring some or all of their SEPs to
patent assertion entities (PAEs) for enforcement. One 2015 study found that 77% of all
assertions of SEPs covering seven widely-adopted interoperability standards made in U.S.
____________________
20

Apple Japan Godo Kaisha v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., IP High Court of Japan, 2013 (Ne) 10043 (May
16, 2014).
21
Id. at 132, 137-38 (noting that out of 1889 patent families declared as essential to UMTS, an independent
research report issued by Fairfield Resources International, Inc. found that only 529 of these patent families “are or
are likely to be essential” to the standard. Accordingly, the court based the royalty due to Samsung on a total pool
of 529, rather than 1889, SEP families).
22
[2017] EWHC 711 (Pat) (Apr. 5, 2017).
23
Id. at ¶178.
24
Id. at ¶¶264-272.
25
Id. at ¶¶325 et seq.
26
Id. at ¶476. In Unwired Planet, the court did not use the above top-down methodology as its primary means
for calculating the FRAND royalty, but as a “cross check” of the result that it obtained using the “comparables”
methodology. The reasons that the court discounted the top-down methodology in this case are discussed in Part I.D,
below.
27
See, e.g., D. Daniel Sokol, Patent Privateering: The Rise of Hybrid Patent Assertion Entities in PATENT
ASSERTION ENTITIES AND COMPETITION POLICY, Ch. 5 (D. Daniel Sokol, ed. 2017); Erik Hovenkamp & Thomas F.
Cotter, Anticompetitive Patent Injunctions, 100 MINN. L. REV. 871 (2016); BJÖRN LUNDQVIST, STANDARDIZATION
UNDER EU COMPETITION RULES AND US ANTITRUST LAWS 412 (2014).
4

district courts between 2000 and 2015 were made by non-practicing entities.28 Another recent
study found that more than 12% of all declared SEPs have been transferred at least once,
outstripping the industry average of 9%.29 Indeed, the PAEs asserting SEPs in both the Innovatio
and Unwired Planet cases obtained those SEPs from operating companies.30
In one recent case, Apple alleged that Nokia, the holder of a large SEP portfolio covering
wireless telecommunications technologies, conspired with Acacia and other PAEs to divide
Nokia’s SEP portfolio so as to inflate licensees’ overall royalty burdens. Apple alleged that this
conduct violated both the SEP holder’s FRAND commitments to ETSI and U.S. antitrust law,
and that Nokia and the PAEs entered into a scheme to “diffuse and abuse” Nokia’s SEP portfolio
by forcing manufacturers to defend multiple suits by different plaintiffs and “demanding far
more in royalties than [Nokia] could have sought on its own”.31 Nokia is alleged to have retained
a financial interest in the proceeds earned by Acacia and the other PAEs from assertion of the
SEPs.32
Irrespective of the outcome of this case, it is clear the ability of a SEP holder to increase
the total royalty burden associated with a SEP portfolio by diffusing the constituent SEPs among
a group of PAEs would be reduced if a top-down royalty approach were used. That is, if the
aggregate royalty associated with a particular SEP portfolio were known and fixed in advance,
then the number of entities holding and possibly asserting individual SEPs would be immaterial:
the aggregate royalty would be the same. It is only when royalties are determined in a case-bycase, bottom-up manner that serial adjudications can yield aggregate royalty burdens that can
greatly exceed the value of a SEP portfolio.
D.

Insufficient Information for Judicial Aggregate Royalty Assessments

Though, as discussed above, courts have become increasingly drawn to top-down
aggregate royalty assessments for SEPs, reliable and systematic methods of determining the
aggregate royalty burden on a particular standard have yet to be developed. One reason that
aggregate royalty determinations are difficult to make in the current environment is that the
royalty rates charged by SEP holders are typically subject to strict confidentiality restrictions and
are largely opaque to the public. Thus, though litigants may be required to disclose their own
license agreements and rates in a judicial proceeding, there is little that can be done to learn the
royalty rates of other holders of SEPs covering the same standard if they are not parties to the
____________________
28

Jorge L. Contreras, When a Stranger Calls—Standards Outsiders and Unencumbered Patents, 12 J. COMP. L.
& ECON. 507, 528 (2016). See also Jorge L. Contreras, Fabian Gaessler, Christian Helmers, and Brian Love
Litigation of Standards-Essential Patents in Europe: A Comparative Analysis, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. __ (2017,
forthcoming) (finding significant levels of SEP assertion by non-practicing entities in Germany and the United
Kingdom).
29
Tim Pohlmann & Knut Blind, Landscaping Study on Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) at 31, Study
Commissioned by European Commission DG GROW Unit F.5 (2016).
30
Innovatio obtained its asserted SEPs from Broadcom. Unwired Planet acquired its asserted SEPs from
Ericsson.
31
Apple Inc. v. Acacia Research Corp., Complaint. No. 16-CV-7266 at 2, 4 (N.D. Cal., filed Dec. 20, 2016).
32
This case is still at an early stage, and the court has not yet ruled on the substantive issues.
5

litigation. This lack of transparency pervades industries such as wireless telecommunications
and computer networking, which are heavily dependent on standardized technologies, and makes
the determination of aggregate royalty rates for these standards challenging at best.33
Faced with these challenges, courts seeking to adopt top-down royalty methodologies
have been forced to rely upon less reliable means of determining aggregate royalty burdens for
widely-adopted standards. Thus, in most of the cases cited above, courts have used a
combination of public statements by SEP holders and other industry participants coupled with
other market factors to assess aggregate royalty burdens on standards. For example, in Unwired
Planet, the court notes eight different press releases and public statements in which industry
participants estimated either the total royalty burden for ETSI’s 3G and 4G standards, or their
share of SEPs covering those standards.34 In some cases, these rates appeared to be mere ballpark
estimates35 and, as noted by the judge, were “obviously self-serving”.36 As a result of the limited
probative value of this evidence, the court chose to use the top-down aggregate royalty rates that
it determined solely as a cross-check against the royalty rates that it calculated using comparable
license agreements, which it viewed, at least, as “concrete data points.” 37
Even more tenuous evidence was utilized by the Japanese IP High Court in Samsung v.
Apple Japan38, which established an aggregate royalty rate of 5% for ETSI’s 3G UMTS
standard. Like the UK court in Unwired Planet, the Japanese court relied on four public
statements and informal agreements among industry participants relating to an aggregate 5%
royalty cap for UMTS SEPs.39 On this basis, the court reasons that “many owners of the UMTS
standard essential patents support the 5% aggregate royalty cap with a view to preventing the
aggregate cap from being excessively high.”40

____________________
33

See Jorge L. Contreras, Colleen Chien, Thomas Cotter and Brad Biddle. Study Proposal – Commercial Patent
Licensing Data (2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2755706 (critiquing lack of
transparency in license transactions).
34
Similar statements were recently relied upon by the parties in TCL Communication Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v.
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, Case No. SACV14-00341 JVS (DFMx), TCL’s Redacted Trial Brief at 8 (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 14, 2017) [hereinafter TCL Trial Brief].
35
For example, in one public statement by “wireless industry leaders”, the maximum reasonable aggregate
royalty level for the 4G LTE standard should be a “single-digit percentage of the sales price”. Unwired Planet at
¶264(i). Another press release by Huawei anticipated “a low single-digit percentage of sales prices as a reasonable
maximum aggregate royalty rate applicable to end-user devices”. Id. at ¶264(iii). This is not to say, of course, that
such statements should be disregarded entirely. In other work, I have argued that public statements made by patent
holders in order to influence the market should presumptively be enforceable against them. Jorge L. Contreras, A
Market Reliance Theory for FRAND Commitments and Other Patent Pledges, 2015 UTAH L. REV 479 (2015). But
while such enforcement could, and should, hold patent holders to their promises, it does little to address the problem
of aggregate royalty burdens across multiple patent holders.
36
Unwired Planet at ¶269.
37
Id. at ¶270. Fortuitously, the royalty rates calculated by the court using the comparables methodology were
quite similar to those calculated using the top-down methodology.
38
Apple Japan Godo Kaisha v. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd., IP High Court of Japan 2013 (Ne) 10043 (May
16, 2014).
39
Id. at 131.
40
Id. at 136.
6

A different approach to determining the aggregate royalty burden for the 3,000 patents
essential to the Wi-Fi standard was utilized by the court in Innovatio. There, the court first
determined, based on expert testimony, that the average profit margin on the sale of a Wi-Fi chip
during the relevant period was 12.1%.41 It then multiplied this percentage by the average price
of a Wi-Fi chip during the period ($14.85), yielding an average total profit of $1.80 per chip.42
The court reasoned that a chip manufacturer could spend no more than its total profit on patent
royalties, and therefor equated the aggregate royalty for all Wi-Fi SEPs to the chip maker’s total
profit.43
While this methodology has merits, it also suffers from a number of questionable
assumptions. First, if a chip manufacturer paid its entire profit to SEP holders, there would be
little reason for that manufacturer to remain in business. Clearly, the manufacturer should be
entitled to retain some share of the profit on its sales. More importantly, it assumes that the
manufacturer’s profit of $1.80 per chip does not already reflect the payment of patent royalties,
leaving the full amount available for royalty payments. However, it may be the case that the
manufacturer is already paying $1.00 per chip in patent royalties, reducing what would otherwise
be a profit of $2.80 to $1.80. Finally, while allocating a manufacturer’s entire profit to patents
covering a single standard may be somewhat plausible for a product such as a Wi-Fi router,
which has as its primary purpose the transmission of Wi-Fi signals, it is difficult to apply to
products such as smartphones and laptops that are compliant with hundreds of standards.44 Thus,
like aggregate royalty calculations based on public statements, the total profit methodology
utilized in Innovatio is substantially lacking in precision.
In each of these cases, once the aggregate royalty burden for the relevant standard was
determined, the total was apportioned to allocate a corresponding share of the total to the
asserting SEP holder.45 But while the court in each of these cases devoted significant attention to
adopting a top-down approach to SEP royalty determination, the effort in each case faltered due
to the difficulty of determining the aggregate royalty burden for the standard in question. The
next section discusses proposals for improving that determination.
II.

PROPOSALS FOR AGGREGATING SEP ROYALTIES

As discussed above, a top-down approach to calculating SEP royalties avoids potential
stacking issues when multiple SEPs cover a single standard. However, accurately determining
____________________
41

Innovatio, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144061 at *174.
Id. at *180.
43
See id. at *161 (“In the hypothetical negotiation, chip manufacturers facing a demand for a royalty far
outstripping their expected profit margin would not agree to take a license on the patents, but would instead exit the
chip-making business.”) See also Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60233 (“you can’t pay
too many royalties before you just run out of profits”).
44
See, e.g., Brad Biddle, Andrew White, & Sean Woods, How Many Standards in a Laptop? (And Other
Empirical Questions), 2010 Int’l Telecomm. Union Sec. Telecomm. Standardization, Kaleidoscope Acad. Conf.
Proc. at 3 & fig. 2 (finding 251 standards implemented in a typical out-of-the-box laptop computer).
45
The method for accomplishing this allocation varies from case to case and itself presents a number of
complex issues that are beyond the scope of this article.
42

7

the aggregate royalty burden for all SEPs covering a standard has proven difficult within a
litigation framework. Courts, relying on evidence presented by the parties to the litigation, lack
the broader perspective of the other holders of SEPs covering the relevant standard, and, as
shown above, the benchmarks that have previously been employed to determine aggregate
royalty levels are crude, at best.46
Nevertheless, over the past several years a variety of proposals have been made that
could improve the determination of aggregate royalty levels for standards. Many of these
proposals seek to improve the accuracy of individual FRAND royalty determinations rather than
aggregate royalty levels for all SEPs covering a standard. Nevertheless, these proposals are
informative when thinking about the determination of aggregate royalty levels. They include
both means for improving judicial royalty determinations, as well as modifications to the
privately ordered interactions among SDO participants.
A.

Litigation Approaches

One of the issues that impacts the calculation of FRAND royalties in litigation is the fact
that, in typical patent lawsuit, the plaintiff is a single patent holder. That patent holder has the
burden of demonstrating the value of its patented technology by introducing evidence not only of
its technical merit, but also of the time, effort and ingenuity that went into its development. In
this setting, every patented technology can be made to appear revolutionary. Missing from this
picture, however, are the many other patented technologies that contribute to the standard that
the asserted patents cover.47 The value of a patented technology, especially one covering a
standard, must be evaluated not in isolation, but in comparison to the other technological
contributions to the standard.48 But infringement actions are litigated patent by patent, patent
holder by patent holder. In a typical action, the owners of the other patented and unpatented
technologies embodied in a standard are not represented. Rather, the accused infringer must
describe the hundreds or thousands of other SEPs covering the standard. Needless to say, this
process is not likely to result in an accurate portrayal of the aggregate value of the patented
contributions to a standard, nor a useful framework for calculating the aggregate royalty burden
on that standard.49

____________________
46

Stanley Besen argues that, given the lack of information available to courts, courts, in general, should not be
placed in the position of determining FRAND royalty rates at all. Stanley M. Besen, Why Royalties for Standard
Essential Patents Should not be Set by the Courts, 15 CHICAGO-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 19 (2016).
47
For example, Justus Baron and Tim Pohlmann report that more than 40,000 and 60,000 SEPs have been
declared to cover ETSI’s 3G and 4G standards, respectively. Justus Baron & Tim Pohlmann, Mapping Standards to
Patents Using Databases of Declared Standard-Essential Patents and Systems of Technological Classification 9–10
(Regulation & Econ. Growth, Working Paper, 2015), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/researchfaculty/searlecenter/innovationeconomics/documents/Baron_Pohlmann_Mapping_Standards.pdf.
48
See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60233, at *__ (W.D. Wash., Apr. 25, 2013),
aff’d, 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015) (the SEP holder must demonstrate both the value of its patented technology to
the relevant standard and the value of the standard to the overall product in which it is implemented).
49
This problem, and other weaknesses in the current litigation system relating to SEP royalty calculations, are
discussed in Bartlett and Contreras, supra note 11, at Part II.B.3.
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As a result, Jason Bartlett and I have recently proposed that the venerable procedural
mechanism of statutory interpleader be resuscitated for suits involving the assertion of patents
covering complex technical standards.50 The interpleader action allows all parties having an
interest in a particular asset (e.g., the funds that a manufacturer has available to pay patent
royalties with respect to a standard) to be haled into court in a single action to divide that asset
amongst themselves. In an interpleader action, each SEP holder may make the case for the value
and contribution of its own patented technology. Such an action would thus overcome the
information gaps that otherwise limit the analytical power of judicial determinations and are
likely to produce a far more accurate result than the methodologies used by courts to date.
This being said, multiparty actions will demand significant resources, both from the parties
and the judicial system. While this level of expenditure may be justified in cases involving large
product markets and multiple competing SEP holders, it may be desirable to find a more
economical alternative for more modest technologies. The next section reviews private ordering
proposals that may address this need.
B. SDO-Based Approaches
A number approaches have been proposed that could be taken by SDOs to facilitate the
assessment of aggregate SEP royalties. Unlike courts, SDO participants, taken together, have
relatively complete information regarding the technologies and patents necessary to determine
the value of the relevant standards. Thus, SDOs, which, in essence, are simply aggregations of
market actors, may be well-placed to develop the most accurate aggregate royalty burdens for
standards. SDO-based approaches useful for determining aggregate royalty burdens fall into two
broad categories: those that involve unilateral action by SEP holders, and those that require
coordination among multiple SEP holders.
1. Unilateral Approaches - Ex Ante Disclosure
Unilateral approaches generally require patent holders to disclose the maximum rates that
they would charge for their SEPs should a patented technology be incorporated into a standard.
This approach results in what Joshua Lerner and Jean Tirole refer to as “structured price
commitments”, in which all SEP holders are required to commit, noncooperatively and
simultaneously, to price caps on royalties.51 If all SEP holders made such commitments, then
SDO participants would know, for each potential standard, the aggregate royalty burden
associated with that standard. In theory, if alternative technologies were available for
standardization, standards developers could also use price as a basis for comparison among these
alternatives.
____________________
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Josh Lerner and Jean Tirole, Standard-Essential Patents, 123 J. POLITICAL ECON. 547 (2015). See also
Dennis W. Carlton & Allan L. Shampine, Identifying Benchmarks for Applying Non-Discrimination in FRAND, CPI
ANTITRUST CHRON., Aug. 2014, at 6-7 (referring to such commitments as “preannouncement”); Mark Lemley, Ten
Things to do About Patent Holdup of Standards (And One Not To), 48 B.C. L. Rev. 149, 158 (2007) (proposing that
patentees specify the content of their RAND licenses ex ante).
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A logical extension of disclosing rates prior to finalization of a standard is the “auction”
approach modelled by Daniel Swanson and William Baumol.52 They liken the selection of
patented technologies for standardization to an auction in which patent holders compete, based
on technical merit and price, to be included in a standard. They reason that such an auction
process would result in the selected technologies being priced at their incremental value above
the next best alternative, and excluding any “hold-up” value attributable to the later adoption of
the standard.53 Thus, more than simply announcing their royalty rates, patent holders would be
able to modify those rates in response to competitive pressure.54
These approaches, which have been characterized in the literature as structured price
commitments, pre-announcements, pre-negotiation and auctioning, are generally referred to in
the industry as “ex ante” disclosure approaches.55 Ex ante disclosure policies have been adopted
by a handful of organizations. In 2006, the Next-Generation Mobile Networks consortium
(NGMN), a group comprised primarily of European mobile network operators, adopted a policy
that required members to disclose their maximum SEP royalty rates to a trusted third party,
which then combined the disclosed rates and reported the aggregated figures to the members.56
Unfortunately, allowing members to report their maximum rates anonymously and without the
need for explanation apparently led to significant inflation in reported rates. According to one
researcher, the aggregate royalties reported to NGMN with respect to some standards approached
130% of the relevant product price and were often structured in a complex manner that made
comparison difficult.57
An ex ante disclosure policy was more successfully adopted by the VMEbus International
Trade Association (VITA) in 2007.58 The VITA policy (which remains in effect today) requires
members to disclose their maximum royalty rates for SEPs covering a standard prior to voting to
adopt that standard. Though one large patent holder (Motorola) strenuously objected to VITA’s
____________________
52
Daniel G. Swanson and William J. Baumol, Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory (RAND) Royalties, Standards
Selection, and Control of Market Power, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2005).
53
Id. at 13.
54
Despite its theoretical appeal, the Swanson-Baumol auction approach is not generally viewed as a solution
that could practically be adopted in the current standard-setting environment. See, e.g., Farrell, et al., supra note 3, at
635 (questioning whether such an auction process is practical) and Anne Layne-Farrar, Gerard Llobet & A. Jorge
Padilla, Preventing Patent Hold Up: An Economic Assessment of Ex Ante Licensing Negotiations in Standard
Setting, 37 AIPLA Q.J. 445, 451-52 (2009) (“the practical challenges of designing, organizing, and implementing
such an auction likely rule out this method for anything more than hindsight-assisted thought experiments”).
55
See, e.g., PATENT CHALLENGES FOR STANDARD-SETTING IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, 46-47 (Keith Maskus &
Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2013) [hereinafter NAS REPORT]; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N,
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 4956 (2007) [hereinafter DOJ/FTC ANTITRUST & IPR], COMM. ON TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION, AM. BAR ASS’N,
STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT PATENT POLICY MANUAL, App. A (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2007) [hereinafter ABA
PATENT POLICY MANUAL] (referring to the “Ex Ante” Question);
56
See Jorge L. Contreras, Technical Standards and Ex Ante Disclosure: Results and Analysis of an Empirical
Study, 53 JURIMETRICS 163, 178-79 (2013).
57
CLAUDIA TAPIA, INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, TECHNICAL STANDARDS AND LICENSING PRACTICES
(FRAND) IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 194 (2010).
58
See Contreras – Ex Ante, supra note 56, at 173-74.
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ex ante policy and eventually withdrew from the organization,59 the policy was generally popular
with the membership and viewed as improving the standardization process.60 In addition, VITA
sought and obtained a favourable business review letter from the U.S. Department of Justice,
acknowledging the potentially procompetitive benefits this approach.61 The European
Commission has likewise indicated that unilateral ex ante disclosures of most restrictive
licensing terms do not, in principle, restrict competition within the meaning of Article 101(a) of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).62
Despite the apparent success of VITA’s ex ante policy, few, if any, other SDOs have
followed its lead.63 There are many possible reasons for the unwillingness of most SDOs to adopt
ex ante disclosure policies.64 But whatever the reasons, unless there is a sea change in the attitude
of SDO participants, policies requiring individual SEP holders to disclose royalty rates do not
seem like viable mechanisms to develop information regarding aggregate royalty burdens for
standards.
2.

Coordinated Approaches - Aggregate Caps

Though unilateral declarations of maximum royalty rates offer improved transparency for
standards developers and product manufacturers, even the most accurate and honest unilateral
declarations do not address issues that can arise when multiple “reasonable” royalties are stacked
on top of one another. And while auctions and other iterative processes may result in the
rationalization of overall royalty rates, such processes may be vulnerable to gamesmanship and
____________________
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Id. at 174-75.
Id. at 204-05.
61
U.S. Dept. of Justice, Business Review Letter to VMEbus International Trade Association (VITA) (Oct. 30,
2006) [hereinafter DOJ 2006 VITA Letter]. See also Renata Hesse, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div.,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the ITU-T Patent Roundtable: Six “Small” Proposals for SSOs Before Lunch, at 8
(Oct. 10, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/287855.pdf (“We saw then and
continue to see now, the potential benefits to competition of such an approach.”)
62
See European Commission, Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
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for ex ante disclosures of most restrictive licensing terms, will not, in principle, restrict competition within the
meaning of Article 101(1)”). See also VALERIO TORTI, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COMPETITION IN
STANDARD SETTING 197-205 (2016) (noting the European Commission’s generally favorable view toward unilateral
ex ante disclosure of maximum terms).
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Standards Setting Organizations Worldwide 94-97 (2012), archived at http://perma.cc/U6FN-XK2E (of ten SDOs
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See Contreras – Ex Ante, supra note 56, at 210-12 (discussing possible reasons for failure of SDOs to adopt
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of ex ante negotiation), Régibeau, et al., supra note 2, at 43 (discussing shortcomings and “practical difficulties”
associated with individual royalty caps).
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defection. Coordinated determination of aggregate royalty rates, however, has the potential to
yield aggregate rates that include the bulk of SEPs covering a particular standard.
Unlike unilateral approaches, which focus on the disclosure and possible adjustment of
royalty rates by individual patent holders, coordinated approaches require the participation of all
(or a substantial number) of the holders of SEPs pertaining to a particular standard. As Dennis
Carlton and Allan Shampine explain, pre-negotiation of terms by SEP holders can reduce the
likelihood of hold-up “as long as firms that can influence the standard can determine, prior to the
standard being set, the terms that would be offered if the patent were to be adopted into the
standard.”65 Though details vary, coordinated approaches generally seek to establish an overall
ceiling or cap on the aggregate SEP royalties that are applicable to a standard. Various
methodologies can then be used to allocate that total among individual SEP holders.66 As such,
these coordinated approaches offer an inherently top-down approach to SEP royalties.
Coordinated approaches have been endorsed by commentators, agency officials and SDO
participants themselves. In some cases, leading market actors seeking to encourage adoption of a
new standard or technology have joined together the make public pledges regarding the rates that
they will charge for their patents.67 For example, between 2002 and 2013, major wireless
telecommunications technology providers including Nokia, Ericsson, Alcatel-Lucent, Motorola
Mobility and Qualcomm made both individual and joint public commitments to cap the royalties
that they would seek on standards such as W-CDMA, LTE and WiMax.68 It is likely that
voluntary commitments such as these helped to induce manufacturers and other market actors to
adopt standards known to be covered by significant numbers of patents. This being said, such
commitments have been made by only a handful of SEP holders, leaving the majority of SEP
holders unaffected. Moreover, as noted above, there is a growing trend toward transfer of SEPs
to patent assertion entities, which may not be bound by pricing commitments made by SEP
holders outside of the SDO setting.69 Thus coordinated approaches like these, while better than
many alternatives, may still not be ideal mechanisms for arriving at accurate aggregate royalty
rates.

____________________
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Carlton & Shampine, supra note 51, at 7.
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3.

Coordinated Approaches – Joint Negotiation

While the coordination of aggregate royalty caps by SEP holders can yield benefits, such
caps are most likely to be accepted broadly if the potential manufacturers of standardized
products are involved in determining aggregate royalty levels.70 The involvement of standards
implementers in the royalty determination process can yield several benefits. Most obviously, of
course, it will be more likely to result in an aggregate royalty that is viewed as acceptable and
reasonable within the relevant industry, resulting in a greater willingness by implementers to
enter into license agreements with SEP holders and fewer disputes over SEP holders’ compliance
with FRAND and other licensing obligations. Moreover, the involvement of implementers in the
royalty determination process may lead to royalty rates that more accurately reflect their on-theground knowledge of production costs and cycles, as well as potential market demand for the
standardized products.
The collective determination of aggregate SEP royalty rates by SEP holders and
implementers can be viewed as a multilateral joint negotiation. Joint royalty negotiation
proposals have been made by a number of academic commentators. Joseph Farrell and coauthors reason that collective negotiation of royalty rates may avoid both hold-up as well as
practical difficulties arising from bilateral negotiation.71 They suggest that a beneficial approach
would be
to permit members of an SSO collectively to negotiate royalties with patent
holders, so long as membership in the SSO does not preclude any individual firm,
or group of firms acting in concert, from producing competing products that do
not comply with the standard. This approach recognizes the benefits of collective
negotiation to prevent hold-up and subjects the SSO to rule of reason evaluation.72
Richard Gilbert also reasons that “if standard-related holdup is likely and substantial,
joint negotiation of licensing terms by the members of an SSO before a standard issues can help
____________________
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Some have suggested that governmental intervention may be necessary to determine appropriate aggregate
royalty caps for SEPs. See, e.g., Govt. of India, Dept. of Industrial Policy & Promotion, Discussion Paper on
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Id. at 635.
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fill the void left by vague FRAND commitments to limit possible opportunistic conduct”.73 In
prior work, I have proposed a methodology termed a “pseudo-pool” in which all relevant
stakeholders in a standards-development group, including both SEP holders and product
manufacturers, must negotiate and agree upon an aggregate royalty rate for all SEPs covering a
standard before the standard is approved or published.74 I suggest that “[c]onsistent with the
FRAND commitment, the Aggregate Royalty must be ‘reasonable’, taking into account the
expected overall market for standardized products, historical royalty rates in the industry, typical
product price ranges, and the like.”75 If an SDO does not wish to be the locus for royalty-setting
negotiations, then “it may authorize a neutral, outside party (e.g., an arbitration panel or neutral
expert appointed by a respected external agency such as the American Arbitration Association
(AAA) or World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)) to facilitate the Aggregate Royalty
determination.”76 Once the aggregate royalty is determined, a subsequent procedure for
allocation among the SEP holders is proposed.77 Finally, because the agreed aggregate rate
would be adopted by the relevant SDO, it (and the manner in which royalties are allocated
among SEP holders) would be binding on all SDO participants, even if they declined to
participate in the rate negotiation.78 What’s more, courts would consistently be able to look to the
SDO’s publicly announced aggregate royalty rates in every case, whether the SEP holder were a
manufacturer, technology developer or PAE.
In a recent report commissioned by the European Commission, Pierre Régibeau, Raphaël
De Coninck and Hans Zenger of Charles River Associates also support the use of aggregate
royalty caps in standard-setting.79 They argue that such caps “can be helpful to alleviate the
negative effects of both hold-up and royalty stacking.”80 They find market-wide benefits arising
from such arrangements, noting that “coordinated pricing of strict complements may allow
limiting potentially excessive royalty requests on the part of individual licensors, thereby leading
to lower final consumer prices and hence more successful commercialization of end products.”81
And, as in my earlier proposal, Régibeau et al. recognize that in order to be successful, a
____________________
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coordinated aggregate royalty cap should involve the participation of significant SEP holders as
well as product manufacturers.82
III. ANTITRUST CONSIDERATIONS FOR JOINTLY-NEGOTIATED AGGREGATE ROYALTIES83
A. The Threat of Oligopsony
Despite the potential efficiencies that jointly-negotiated aggregate royalty caps may offer
to standards developers and implementers, few if any SDOs have adopted them. One of the
principal reasons offered by SDOs and patent holders for their reluctance to engage in collective
negotiation of aggregate royalty rates is antitrust law. Specifically, it has been suggested that a
group of manufacturers negotiating license rates with a SEP holder could collectively exert
anticompetitive pressure to depress the SEP holder’s royalties below a reasonable level, and even
to zero, thereby devaluing the patents covering the standard.84 As argued by J. Gregory Sidak,
“ex ante collective action that is privately undertaken in an [SDO] to counteract potential patent
holdup may facilitate, if not serve as an outright façade for, horizontal price fixing by
oligopsonists of the patented input.”85 Another line of objection arises from the potential impact
of group negotiation on incentives to innovate: “The potential danger .. is that by negotiating as a
group, technology users could extract such favourable terms from patent holders (another form
of hold-up) that they will inefficiently discourage future innovation”.86
These arguments have held considerable sway in the industry and have influenced
enforcement authorities, particularly in Europe. In early 2005, a proposal to cap aggregate
royalty rates on new wireless telecommunications standards was made to ETSI by several of its
members.87 Despite significant interest, discussion of this proposal within ETSI was terminated
following receipt of a 2006 letter from the European Commission’s Competition Directorate____________________
82
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General.88 The EC’s letter questioned whether an aggregate royalty cap would impermissibly
preclude price competition, as it would involve fixing the “price” of each SEP in advance.
Instead of an aggregate royalty cap, the Commission expressed a preference for “pure”
(unilateral) ex ante disclosures of royalty terms, which would enable price competition among
competing patented technologies. Eventually, as noted above, ETSI adopted a policy permitting
voluntary disclosures of royalty terms, but not requiring either individual disclosure of royalty
terms or collective determination of aggregate royalties.89
The U.S. DOJ and FTC have also recognized the potential for joint negotiations to lead to
anticompetitive conduct including naked price fixing.90 Short of such per se illegal conduct, such
joint negotiations might also be prohibited under a rule of reason analysis
if there were no viable alternatives to a particular patented technology that is
incorporated into the standard, the IP holder's market power was not enhanced by
the standard, and all potential licensees refuse to license that particular patented
technology except on agreed-upon licensing terms. In such circumstances, the ex
ante negotiation among potential licensees does not preserve competition among
technologies that existed during the development of the standard but may instead
simply eliminate competition among the potential licensees for the patented
technology.91
Responding to concerns of this nature, a number of SDOs, including IEEE and ETSI,
expressly prohibit the negotiation or discussion of royalty terms during SDO meetings.92 And
even when such coordinated action is not expressly prohibited, it is frequently raised as a
concern when aggregate royalty discussions are suggested.93 As observed by Régibeau, et al,
“part of the antitrust community still has an almost instinctive allergy to the idea of rivals setting
prices together.”94 If aggregate royalty determinations are to be utilized in top-down FRAND
royalty calculations, antitrust aversion to them must be overcome.
____________________
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B. Patent Pools and Aggregate Royalty Determinations
Any analysis of aggregated patent royalties would be incomplete without some
consideration of patent pools. In a typical patent pool covering a standardized technology,
multiple patent holders designate a single agent to license the pooled patents to third parties at an
agreed rate and to distribute net revenues among the pool participants in accordance with a predetermined formula. Patent pools thus enable product manufacturers to obtain licenses to many
patents simultaneously with reduced transaction costs. Pools have been employed effectively in
connection with a number of widely adopted standards such as MPEG-2, CD and DVD. In each
of these cases, a small group of patent holders formed a pool containing relevant SEPs and
excluding patents that were not essential to the standard.95 The U.S. Department of Justice has
reviewed several of these pools and found that they did not raise antitrust concerns. Among the
procompetitive benefits that the DOJ attributed to these pools was their ability to “create
substantial integrative efficiencies by reducing the time and expense of disseminating . . . patents
to interested licensees, clearing blocking positions, and integrating complementary
technologies.”96
The rates at which the pooled patents are licensed is determined by agreement among the
contributing patent holders, taking into account relevant market factors.97 The DOJ and FTC
have stated that they “generally do not assess the reasonableness of royalties set by patent
pools.”98 Rather, they “focus on the pool’s formation and whether its structure, including the
terms of the contract among pool participants, would likely enable pool participants to raise
prices or restrict output in a relevant market.”99 Thus, merely coordinating the price at which a
group of patents will be licensed to others is not itself viewed as anticompetitive, absent other
evidence of anticompetitive behavior.100
Given the benefits and favorable antitrust assessment of patent pools, it is worth asking
why voluntary consensus standardization is still carried out through SDOs that do not pool
essential patents. Recent studies find that the large majority of SEPs are licensed by individual
SEP holders under SDO FRAND rules, rather than as part of patent pools.101 There are several
____________________
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reasons that this may be the case. First, the formation of a patent pool can be expensive. Unlike
SDOs, patent pools must ensure, with a reasonable degree of certainty, that the pooled patents
are actually essential to the relevant standard.102 For this reason, parties creating patent pools
typically engage in a lengthy and costly vetting process to assess the essentiality of each patent
that is proposed for inclusion in the pool. Estimates of the cost of such assessments are in the
range of US$10,000 per patent.103 Because many SDO standards are never widely adopted or
have limited application, and given the large numbers of patents that are sometimes involved,
most SDO participants are reluctant to make up-front investments of this magnitude for every
standard under development.104 Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro also observe that pool formation
around complex interoperability standards may be hindered by the number of patentees and
patents involved, significant variations in the scope and strength of these patents, and the
involvement of non-manufacturing patent holders.105 Thus, for several reasons, while SDOdeveloped standards are vulnerable to the patent stacking issues addressed by patent pools, SEPs
covering these standards are typically not included in patent pools.
C. Joint Negotiation and Procompetitive Benefits
Like the holders of pooled patents, SDO participants can achieve efficiencies and other
procompetitive benefits by coordinating the aggregate rates at which SEPs covering a standard
are licensed. As noted by Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro, collective negotiation of SEP royalty
rates is “very likely to be procompetitive if the technology would otherwise be so encumbered by
patent rights and blocking positions that the standard would have difficulty moving forward in
the market.”106 Robert Skitol argues that such joint activity also enhances the “quality of decision
making” within an SDO and “increases the prospects for achieving a procompetitive ‘open’
standards outcome”.107 Moreover, Shapiro observes that some SDOs’ discouragement or outright
prohibition of ex ante discussion of pricing terms108 has had the ironic result of “embolden[ing]
some companies to seek substantial royalties after participating in formal standard setting
activities.”109
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The U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies have also indicated that ex ante joint negotiation
of SEP licensing terms has “the strong potential for procompetitive benefits”.110 As early as
2005, Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman of the FTC, specifically explained the potential
procompetitive benefits of joint ex ante negotiation of licensing terms in the SDO context:
[J]oint ex ante royalty discussions . . . can be a sensible way of preventing hold
up, which can itself be anticompetitive. Put another way, transparency on price
can increase competition among rival technologies striving for incorporation into
the standard at issue. They may allow the “buyers” (the potential licensees in the
standard-setting group) to get a competitive price from the “sellers” (the rival
patentees vying to be incorporated into the standard that the group is adopting)
before lock in ends the competition for the standard and potentially confers
market power on the holder of the chosen technology. . . . If joint ex ante royalty
discussions succeed in staving off hold up, we can generally expect lower royalty
rates to lead to lower marginal costs for the standardized product and lower
consumer prices. By mitigating hold up, joint ex ante royalty discussions might
also make possible the more timely and efficient development of standards. A
reduction in ex ante uncertainty on royalty rates may reduce the extent to which
litigation is needed to resolve issues relating to patent and standards. Joint ex ante
royalty discussions also could prevent delays in the implementation of the
standard resulting from ex post litigation (or threats of it), which may involve
inefficient allocation of resources intended for innovation.111
In response to suggestions that “group buying power” might be used inappropriately by
SDO members to depress SEP prices, the DOJ and FTC acknowledge that the use of ex ante
licensing discussions as “a sham to cover up naked agreements on the licensing terms each IP
holder will offer the SSO”, a means “to reach side price-fixing agreements” or an effort “to fix
the price of standardized products” would likely be condemned as per se violations of the
antitrust laws.112 However, the agencies go on to note that these risks “are not sufficient to
condemn all multilateral ex ante licensing negotiations, particularly given the fact that [t]hose
developing standards already have extensive experience managing this risk.”113 In contrast, they
conclude that:
[i]n most cases, it is likely that the Agencies would find that joint ex ante activity
undertaken by an SSO or its members to establish licensing terms as part of the
standard-setting process is likely to confer substantial procompetitive benefits by
____________________
110

DOJ/FTC ANTITRUST & IPR, supra note 55, at 54. See also DOJ 2006 VITA Letter, supra note 61, at 9 n.27;
Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman of the Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the Standardization and the Law
Conference: Recognizing the Procompetitive Potential of Royalty Discussions in Standard Setting, at 7-8 (Sept. 23,
2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/050923stanford.pdf (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
112
DOJ/FTC ANTITRUST & IPR, supra note 55, at 55.
113
Id. (emphasis in original, internal quotation marks omitted).
111

19

avoiding hold up that could occur after a standard is set.114
Based on this reasoning, the agencies conclude that joint ex ante negotiation of licensing terms in
the standard-setting context should not be condemned as per se illegal, but rather evaluated on a
rule of reason basis.115
Michael Carrier identifies several characteristics of SDOs that significantly reduce the
risk of anticompetitive oligopsonistic behavior by product manufacturers. These include the
involvement of SEP holders in royalty negotiations, the power that SEP holders wield in the
standardization process, the unpredictability regarding which patented technologies will
ultimately be included in a standard, and the inability of product manufacturers to reduce their
purchases to depress prices.116
Moreover, were product manufacturers in an SDO to exert the type of oligopsonistic
downward royalty pressure envisioned by Sidak and others,117 patent holders would likely defect
from such an SDO.118 The abandonment of an SDO by patent holders would remove such patent
holders from the ambit of the SDO’s rules, including its FRAND commitments. Thus, forcing
patent holders out of SDOs would worsen the position of implementers, as SEP-holding
“outsiders” could charge substantial and comparatively unconstrained (i.e., supra-FRAND)
royalties for licenses of their SEPs and seek injunctions against the use of their patented
technologies.119 Thus, even to the extent that potential anticompetitive effects could arise from
joint negotiation of aggregate royalties, in the words of one senior DOJ official, these must be
balanced against “the inefficiencies of ex post negotiations and licensing hold up.”120
Admittedly, it is likely, as several economists predict using different negotiation models,
that SEP royalties negotiated collectively will be lower than those that would be negotiated in
serial bilateral transactions.121 This result has the potential to reduce investment incentives for
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technology developers to participate in standard setting, thereby reducing the overall value of
standards produced. A reduction of incentives, however, is not fatal from an antitrust
perspective. As one DOJ official explains, “harm to a particular faction does not necessarily
equate to harm to competition. If a particular SDO’s policy would reduce the royalties obtained
by a particular patentee, that is not necessarily a violation of the antitrust laws.”122 Thus, even if
royalties to one or a group of SEP holders were reduced as a result of collective negotiation of
such rates, an antitrust violation would not necessarily arise absent other forms of abusive
conduct (e.g., coordination of downstream product prices), and would need to be considered in
light of the procompetitive factors noted above.123
It is also important to remember that, to date, the debate regarding “joint negotiation” in
the context of SEP royalties has largely focused on concerted action by potential licensees. That
is, the central question has been whether product manufacturers and standards implementers
within an SDO should be permitted to negotiate with a SEP holder regarding the rates that it will
charge if its patented technology is included in a standard. If the proffered rate is too high, then
the SDO members may chose a less expensive alternative, or persuade the SEP holder to lower
its rate (hence the spectre of oligopsony).
But the organizational dynamic with respect to negotiation of aggregate SEP royalties is
somewhat different. Here, manufacturers and implementers will not be negotiating with
individual SEP holders, but with all SEP holders as a group. Thus, SEP holders can also form a
coalition within this negotiation framework, thereby lessening the risk that they will be taken
advantage of by “buyers” operating in concert. Moreover, the negotiation leverage of the buyer
group in this negotiation would be less than it otherwise would be in the traditional joint
negotiation setting, because, ideally, all SEP holders will be engaged on the “other side”. Thus, if
implementers exert too much downward pressure on the royalties sought by SEP holders as a
group, they risk defection not only by a single SEP holder, but by all SEP holders. And once a
significant number of SEPs become unencumbered by any licensing commitments, the success
of the proposed standard in the market may be seriously compromised.
D. A Role for Agencies in Aggregate Royalty Discussions
Lawyers and engineers are by their natures cautious. As such, it may take more than law
review articles to persuade SDOs to take the first steps toward authorizing aggregate royalty
negotiations. Far more persuasive would be affirmative statements from relevant antitrust
enforcement agencies condoning such coordinated conduct under the right circumstances. In
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order to assuage the fear of antitrust law, governmental actors can, and should, clarify the
permissibility of joint negotiation of aggregate royalties within the standardization context. Such
clarifications could take several forms.
First are policy documents and guidance issued directly by the agencies. Enforcement
agencies such as the DOJ and FTC in the United States, the European Commission in the
European Union and corresponding agencies in countries such as China, Japan, Korea, India and
Canada, have all recently published guidelines regarding antitrust, patents and standards.124 Each
of these agencies could explicitly indicate that antitrust enforcement would be unlikely with
respect to the negotiation of aggregate royalties for standards, absent other anticompetitive
conduct.
Second, agencies may respond to requests for clarification and intent that are submitted
by private parties. In the U.S. the DOJ’s business review letter procedure offers a convenient
and (relatively) inexpensive way for parties to obtain an early indication regarding the agency’s
views of a particular transaction.125 Several such letters have already been issued in the area of
voluntary consensus standardization.126 To the extent that an SDO were considering
implementing a joint negotiation approach to develop aggregate SEP royalties for its standards, it
would do well to consider requesting a business review letter from the DOJ. This would provide
the agency with an opportunity to clarify whether the proposed approach raises antitrust
concerns.127
Finally, the legislature could take action in this regard. For example, in the U.S. a
relatively modest amendment to the Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of
2004,128 a statute that already offers limited antitrust immunity to SDOs, could clarify that
negotiation and agreement on aggregate royalty caps in standard-setting do not constitute
violations of the Sherman Act or FTC Act, absent some other anticompetitive conduct. A similar
legislative approach could be taken in Europe and other countries in which antitrust, patent and
standards issues are currently the subject of regulatory activity.
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While agency and legislative action are not required for SDOs to develop and utilize
aggregate royalty caps, such clarifications by authoritative governmental bodies could clear the
way for SDOs to adopt such policies.
IV. CONCLUSION
Top-down methodologies for calculating FRAND royalties for patents covering voluntary
industry standards are increasingly favored by courts and antitrust enforcement agencies. Yet,
without significant alterations to current litigation systems in the U.S. and elsewhere, bilateral
disputes between parties offer courts too little information to make informed determinations of
aggregate royalty levels applicable to particular standards. As a result, the basis for allocating
royalties among individual patent holders is flawed. A preferred means for determining the
appropriate aggregate royalty applicable to a particular standard could be joint negotiation
among SDO participants, including both patent holders and potential manufacturers of
standardized products, prior to the approval of the standard. Despite the potential benefits of this
approach, fears of antitrust liability have caused SDOs to avoid adopting it in their internal
procedures. Several SDOs, in fact, prohibit any discussion of royalty levels as part of the SDO’s
proceedings. I argue that these fears are largely unfounded, a position that has been validated by
antitrust enforcement agencies in both the U.S. and Europe. In the large majority of cases, the
procompetitive benefits of joint negotiation of aggregate royalty levels should outweigh
anticompetitive harms. The ex ante determination of aggregate royalty levels for standards would
substantially facilitate bilateral negotiation of SEP license agreements and reduce the complexity
and unpredictability of SEP litigation. Accordingly, it is time for antitrust enforcement agencies
to be more explicit in encouraging the use of collective negotiation mechanisms to support the
determination of aggregate royalty burdens on voluntary industry standards and for SDOs to step
up to this important role.
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